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Abstract 
 
There is a lot of literature about implementing information systems and numbers of papers 
describe failures and successes in implementations. Problems impede successful outcomes of 
information system projects, influencing e.g. on the interaction between project parties or on 
the learning process, slowing it down and killing time. Problems in implementing information 
systems are connected with risks and accident models can be used to describe causes of 
failure. This paper describes how a hierarchical accident model is a suitable framework 
when modeling information system failures. This study presents findings in literature and 
empirical experiences concerning problems. The empiric case comes from the university 
world where several universities acted as one client, taking into pilot use a common 
information system to support student mobility between the universities. 
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1. Introduction 
The implementation of an information system (IS) is a process that very likely leads to failure 
instead of success (Lyytinen and Hirschheim 1987; Lyytinen and Lehtinen 1987; Sauer 1993; 
Kumar et al. 1998; Schmidt et al. 2001). This paper presents how using the hierarchical 
framework introduced by Leveson (2001) a new approach can be found. The obstacles or 
problems which are found in the empiric case are presented using a model which is not 
commonly known in the context of information systems. 
 
This research pays attention to findings in literature and in a case where an IS was 
implemented (Halonen 2004a). It concentrates on the obstacles impeding the success of the 
implementation project and considers obstacles and risks being related to each other. 
Therefore the authors offer methods to help identifying obstacles and risks that are related to 
implementation projects. By using the Hierarchical Accident Model introduced by Leveson 
(2001) the problems are presented in three levels. This model was originally developed to 
analyses of accident causation. We suggest that the model can also be connected with 
problems and thus help in recognizing and managing them. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next chapter introduces literature related to 
implementing information systems. After that, the accident models are described. Then we 
describe the research methods and study material, following with the case description. 
Combined results come next, constituting the main results of the research. This paper ends 
with conclusion. 
 
2. Related Literature 
There is a lot of literature concerning implementing information systems. This paper 
considers implementing information systems as Laudon and Laudon (1988) defined it: “All 
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organizational activities working toward the adoption, management, and routinization of an 
innovation”. Developing and implementing an IS are instances of organizational change 
(Davis and Olson 1985) and they often lead to changes in work processes and structures of 
the personnel (Eason 1988; Sahay and Robey 1996). As Lorenzi and Riley stated (2003), all 
shortcomings that impede successful outcome lead to stress and change-resistive behaviors. 
Literature recognizes success factors and measures that are useful when evaluating the 
success or failure of an IS project (Lucas 1981; Markus 1983; Lyytinen and Lehtinen 1987; 
Kumar et al. 1988; DeLone and McLean 1992). Therefore, we present here some issues 
which are seen as obstacles: conflicts, social dynamics, lack of knowledge or lack of sharing 
it, user participation, management problems, resistance to change and, commitment to an IS 
project. 
 
Conflict literature discusses recognizing conflict and preconditions for managing conflicts 
(Bodtker and Jameson 2001). According to them, recognizing an increasing conflict in the 
relationships between project people demands that the emotions of the people involved are 
identified and thus the possibilities to manage the conflict are better. Barki and Hartwick 
(2001) deliberated how conflict management and the level of interpersonal conflict affect 
outcomes of IS projects. They proposed five models to manage conflicts: asserting, 
accommodating, compromising, problem solving and avoiding. These models seem natural to 
be used also in the current research. Newman and Robey (1992) represented a social process 
model to guide research in the social dynamics of system development. Their model 
described episodes and encounters involving both the users and the designers, and because of 
the altering situation interaction between the parties, the model proved to be dynamic. The 
experiences of the authors of this paper show that the encounters between project parties 
seem to act in the same way. 
 
Mumford (2003) expounded on solving problems by understanding social dynamics of the 
problem and identifying pressure points. Mumford (2003) continued by clarifying that it is no 
use removing symptoms instead of causes. She added that lack of knowledge hinders the 
problem-solving process in the beginning, when clarification and description of the problem 
are important. Lack of knowledge is emphasized also in the article of Ljungström and Klefsjö 
(2002) who studied obstacles in implementing a strategy of a total quality management 
(TQM) system. They described obstacles as “barriers and hurdles obstructing the flow of 
activities and changes in behavior, which are ultimate aims in the quest for an organization’s 
improvement”. Ciborra and Andreu (2001) discussed knowledge related to organizational 
context. They believed that managing knowledge differs in different organizational contexts. 
 
The role of user participation in IS developments and implementations has been under 
discussion (Markus 1983; Markus and Benjamin 1996; Sahay and Robey 1996; Kumar et al. 
1998; Cairns and Beech 1999; Dewulf and van Meel 2002; Jiang et al. 2002; Mumford 2003).  
Newman and Noble (1990) described in a case study that the contribution is not always 
evident and that the user participation is only weakly associated with the success of 
implementation. User participation can be also seen as a security threat and therefore user 
participation may be rejected in IS projects (c.f. Siponen 2002). On the other hand, user 
participation can bring expertise and know-how to the project and it may be essential in cases 
when the designer is not familiar with the branch (e.g. Halonen 2004b).  
 
Benamati and Lederer (2000) discussed the management problems in information technology 
changes. They raised the challenges in front and point to information technology acquisitions 
and implementation processes. Lyytinen and Lehtinen (1987) concluded that basically all 
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problems in information systems development can be blamed to derive from technical 
problems. This can be seen as level one or three problem in the hierarchical accident model. 
On the other hand, Griffith and Northcraft (1996) found that less than 10 percent of 
implementation failures stemmed from technical problems and most of them occurred 
because of human and organizational reasons, including users’ misunderstanding of the 
technology.  
 
Macri et al. (2002) presented a grounded theory for resistance to change and express that 
resistance to change can lead to reduced co-operation in an organization. According to them 
resistance to change is linked with organizational and shared learning. By hindering shared 
learning the members in the organization guard their personal knowledge and gained 
experience. Lorenzi and Riley (2003) emphasized the need of effective management of 
resistance to change and to turn resistance into commitment. 
 
Commitment to an IS project work has been recognized as a success factor (e.g. Lucas 1981). 
Newman and Sabherwal (1996) studied commitment in their longitudinal study and they 
found that the level and changes in commitment are significant factors in the project. 
According to them, erratic commitment can increase the loss in the IS project e.g. when 
management level does not want to get rid of a project that is failing. 
 
According to Lorenzi and Riley (2003) shortcomings in project management, technology and 
organizational issues turn to be main causes for problems, added with information explosion. 
They raise three sets of skills that are needed in order to avoid problems: 1) technical skills, 
2) project management skills, and 3) people and organizational skills.  
 
According to Effron (2004) there is no incentive to share knowledge, meaning that people are 
busy with their tasks even without the need to write their knowledge to any databases. Effron 
(2004) continued that learning to share knowledge needs overcoming cultural obstacles. 
Culture and social background has its impact on changes in organizations and implementing 
new technology (e.g. Noble 1986; Walsham 1993; Halonen 2004c). 
 
In addition, it is not always self-explanatory if an IS project is a success or failure. According 
to Sauer (1993) an IS development project is a failure when the management terminates it. 
Larsen and Myers (1999) discussed what if an information system turns to be a failure even if 
it was already evaluated to be successful. Halonen (2004b) described an implementation 
project that seemed to be a failure but instead it might have been a step forward in the 
technological progress in that environment. 
 
3. Framework 
This research was carried out in order to find out how the obstacles in implementing 
information systems could be assessed. Furthermore, the study expresses how the means of 
risk management and accident investigation can be used in managing obstacles.  Accidents 
models are used to explain how and why accidents occur and what events or circumstances 
are behind accidents. 
 
A well known accident model is the domino model where Heinrich (1931) proposed that 
accidents are caused by people, not matters. In his model, there are five dominoes: 1) An 
ancestry or a social environment which leads to 2) the fault of a person, and is a proximate 
reason for 3) an unsafe act or a condition and it causes 4) an accident that leads to 5) an injury 
or losses. When the first domino falls, all other dominoes will fall down too. If any of the 
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dominoes will be removed, it will break the sequence and prevent injury or losses. The first 
falling domino is treated as an initiative event and it is a stopping point in tracing back what 
has happened. In Heinrich’s model this event was considered to be some kind of human error 
or a component failure. Even no failure happens also number of “it-was-close” situations can 
be meaningful. These indicate exposure to risk even no loss has occurred. By analyzing these 
events we can be more aware of risks exposure. 
 
Civil Aeronautical Board (1962) introduced “multi-linear-events sequence” model where 
several parallel chains of events are created based on data from a flight data recorder. This 
was one of the first methods that used several parallel event chains to explain causes of 
accident. Implicitly this means that there might be several obstacles or event sequences, 
which can not cause harm by them selves but all together can cause significant failure. In US 
National Safety Council Model (in Leveson 1995, 191) was one important discovery. Its 
basic is close to the domino model but just after immediate factors of accident there is a 
“Point of No Return”. McClay (2003) used a term “Point of Irreversibility”. When this point 
has been reached some measurable losses or failures will come up. Before that there is a way 
to prevent losses and go back to the normal action.  
 
The Domino and some related process models have been criticized because most accidents 
involve variety of events and conditions. Identifying only a single factor as a root reason for 
accident is misleading and can be a hindrance in preventing future accidents. E.g. Lewycky 
(1987, 6-8) criticizes that we often isolate one condition and call it “the cause” and other 
conditions that are “contributory” to the basis for these distinctions are not found. Also 
Leveson (1995, 56) argued that most accidents in well-designed systems involve two or more 
low-probability events occurring in the worst possible combination and major accident often 
stems to flaws in security culture or society and organization Leveson (1995, 53).  
Especially overconfidence and complacency (which is common element in major accidents) 
are typical. This means that a single event seldom is a real cause to an accident or there 
simply is not such a single event which can start a chain of accidents - there might be several 
parallel or nonparallel events which might start a chain of accidents.  
 
Sometimes accidents may be prevented most effectively not by eliminating direct causes 
identified by the chain of events, but by indirectly manipulating other factors. The 
hierarchical accident model (Lewycky 1987, Leveson 1995, Leveson 2001) provides multiple 
models of accident causation at different levels of abstraction. In the three-level model 
(Figure 1) the lower level describes the accident mechanism (the chain of events). The second 
level includes conditions or lack of conditions that affect to the occurrence of events at the 
first time. Factors in the third and the highest level, sometimes called root causes or 
systematic factors, affect general classes of accidents. They are weaknesses of technical, 
human, organizational, managerial, or social nature that not only contribute to the accident 
being investigated but are likely to affect classes of accidents in the future. Often responses to 
accidents involve fixing only a specific condition while leaving the general systemic factors 
untouched. Countermeasures aimed at preventing accidents described by hierarchical models 
require making changes at all levels, particularly the systematic factors in the level three. 
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Level 2. Conditions
Level 3. Systemic Factors
Level 1. Events or Accident Mechanism
  
Figure 1.  The Hierarchical Accident model ( Leveson, 2001, 9). 
 
According to Leveson (1995, 47), large scale engineering systems are more than just a 
collection of technological artifacts: They are reflections of the structure, management, 
procedures and a culture of an engineering organization that created them and they are 
usually a reflection of a society where they were created and used.  Causes of accidents are 
frequently, if not almost always, rooted in the organizations - their culture, management, and 
structures.  Also Rasmussen (1997) emphasized this. An IS implementation success has 
several analogies to accidents that happen in large and complex systems. In both cases 
usually no single cause of failure can be named as a cause but rather a sequence of several 
events which together finally cause losses or failure.  
 
 
4. Research Method and Study Material  
Action research is argued to be ideal for studying information systems in practice 
(Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998). A combination of action research (Schön 1983; Ayas 
and Zeniuk 2001) and public reflection-in-action (Heiskanen 1995; Raelin 2001; Mason 
2002; Coghlan and Brannick 2003) has been chosen as the research method because of the 
strong involvement of the first author and the participants in the empiric case. There has been 
discussion about action research having several different forms (e.g. Baskerville and 
Wood-Harper 1998) and this study at hand performs action research without recognizable 
cyclical process.  
 
According to Mason (2002), at the heart of all practice lies noticing: noticing an opportunity 
to act appropriately. To notice an opportunity to act requires three things: being present and 
sensitive in the moment, having a reason to act, and having a different act come to mind. 
Furthermore, an academic actor-researcher (Lallé 2003) as a concept belongs to this study by 
meaning researcher working in an organization and generating new scientific knowledge. 
Ayas and Zeniuk (2001) emphasized “effective collaboration between academics and 
managers, thus benefiting both practice and theory, enhancing the significance of research, 
informing both practitioners’ and academics’ views and actions”. 
 
The research presents findings from literature and from a case study. It is essential that the 
case offers possibilities for learning and getting better understanding about implementations 
in different environments (Stake 2000) and therefore it is a pertinent choice in this paper. 
According to Yin (2003) “using case studies for research purposes remains one of the most 
challenging of all social science endeavors”. The case is reported by bearing the idea of van 
der Blonk (2003) when he stated that cases are written with a purpose that heads to the goal 
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of the research project. He continued that the researcher is interpreting the case when writing 
it down. The case is described in detail enough in order to give a good understanding of the 
environment and to help the reader to get a view of actions that were performed.  
 
The case comes from the university world where several universities were involved as one 
client and designing and implementing one IS to support the management of student mobility. 
This case is an intrinsic case (Stake 2000) offering diversified environment with several 
interest groups and project parties. The empirical material is gathered from the memos and 
memorandums from meetings and encounters, and from the personal observations made by 
the first author. Van Maanen (1988) remarks that field data are constructed from talk and 
action and thus they are interpretations of other interpretations and that they are mediated 
many times. Van Maanen continues that case studies are presented with differing styles. This 
paper presents the case realistic, pointing critically out some issues that behave like obstacles.  
 
Like Coghlan and Brannick (2002) suggest, the researcher has written a personal diary during 
her working in the case. In qualitative research studies the benefit of diaries is realized when 
writing out the cases (Newbury 2001). The purpose of personal notes is to facilitate the 
research process through recording observations, thoughts and questions when they happen to 
be used by the researcher (Newbury 2001). The approach is subjective and reflecting on the 
past of the researcher, relying on the remarks of Frankl (1963) when he states how our 
experiences and past have made us what we are. In this sense the approach is also 
interpretative (Walsham 1993) because the approach is very subjective, the observations and 
findings reflecting strongly on our personal presence. Mason (2002) states: “Writing 
autobiographical and other notes, keeping a journal, and mentally re-entering salient 
moments can assist professional development and be integral to research”.  
 
5. Empirical Findings 
The case comes from the university world where several universities were involved as one 
client and designing and implementing one IS to support the management of student mobility 
between Finnish universities. It is expected that the movement increases multiply during the 
following years. The first author was working as a project manager in a project that produced 
an IS project called MoSu. It was based on a previous effort when specifications and a 
demonstration model of the user interface for the new IS were made by other actors during 
preceding years. In the first phase MoSu was to be piloted by three universities in the 
Helsinki metropolitan area but the use will be extended to be nationwide in the following 
years. In addition to the universities, the Finnish Virtual University (FVU) participated into 
the project. Other main stakeholders were two vendors and the Ministry of Education that 
funded the project. The vendors began their work on the basis that MoSu will cover the 
whole process of student mobility between universities. 
 
The MoSu project had started in very versatile circumstances where the specifications and 
plans had changed along the time and some specifications were not completed because of the 
lack of resources in previous years. Changes in the personnel necessitated knowledge sharing 
between the former project personnel and the current personnel. Because the administration 
of the mobility differed in every university, the three universities pointed out the importance 
of piloting while the FVU emphasized the importance of getting a nationwide IS. Discussion 
continued when the FVU announced its new project FlexStu that was to serve students 
nationwide in applying for rights to study in other universities. This project seemed like a 
competitive project for MoSu and it surprised all other participants in the meeting. Steps were 
never discussed openly and the competition between these projects had reverberated to all 
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encounters and meetings of the MoSu project. The changes in the requirements had given 
extra difficulties to the vendors (and the project manager) to understand the scope of MoSu 
because FlexStu was to implement the first steps in the mobility support. 
 
The user authentication and user administration will be one of the crucial tasks to be catered 
before MoSu would have access to the information systems in different universities. The 
knowledge sharing between FlexStu and MoSu appeared to be problematic; one vendor 
owning the information concerning FlexStu and the other vendor having main responsibility 
of carrying out the new IS. Holding knowledge has been evident, slowing down the 
co-operation between vendors and inflicting on discussions and meetings. Then again the role 
of FlexStu was changed to implement a uniform application and to give extensive 
information about studies in other universities. 
 
The nature and amount of information that were discussed in the project meetings seemed to 
appear problematic. The representatives of student affairs offices were not interested in 
technical details but the technique was important when e.g. the processing rules of 
applications had to be specified and decisions made. The vendor tried to explain everything 
in depth in order to help the officials from student affairs offices to understand the functions. 
There were problems with the information in two ways: there were too much technical 
information addressed to wrong people and there were insufficient information delivered 
between the experts.  
 
Culture and social background as well as economical competition may also be an obstacle 
when they appear like impeding the implementation process. The case has shown that 
working in a university world has been free and there is not much power of commands. This 
means that things will be done when somebody feels them important – not because someone 
else tells to do them. In this sense freedom can be seen as an obstacle when it is preventing 
the performance of work and commitment to common goals. 
 
In February 2004 the financier arranged an information seminar that was addressed to the 
directors of EDP offices in universities and polytechnics. The aim of the seminar was to 
introduce MoSu and FlexStu as being a common intent in supporting the student mobility. 
This seminar made visible the overlapping role of the two projects. These actions proved the 
problem with overlapping in projects and their influence on each other. The overlapping was 
not preventing the whole implementation of MoSu but it was really hindering the designing 
of it. At the beginning of the collaboration between the FVU and the MoSu project there 
appeared to be competition about the tool to be used. 
 
The implementation has proceeded to the piloting phase and so far the case expresses four 
interesting obstacles: several parties involved, disputes over focus, overlapping projects, 
power game between project members. In this case the obstacles were related to each other, 
affecting on the implementation and impeding the progress.  
 
6. Combined Results  
This paper introduces a model to be used when managing obstacles that may appear in 
implementing information systems. The model is developed for analyzing accident causation 
at different levels of abstraction. However, the authors believe that also IS implementations 
will gain from the hierarchical accident model introduced by Leveson (2001). 
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When using hierarchical accident model, findings from previous IS literature (Table 1) 
mostly seem to belong to levels two and three. This supports assumptions made by Leveson 
(2001), Lewycky (1987) and Rasmussen (1997) that failures are not primarily caused because 
of direct event sequence but because of poor conditions and systematic factors and obstacles 
in social, cultural, organizational and technological level.  
 
  Authors(s) Found obstacles 
Level 3 
Systemic  
factors 
Noble 1986, Walsham 1993, Halonen 2004c 
Newman and Robey (1992), 
Griffith and Northcraft (1996) 
Macri et al. (2002), Lyytinen and Lehtinen 
(1987) 
 
Lorenzi and Riley (2003)    
Inappropriate culture and social 
background, Social process 
episodes 
Users’ misunderstanding of the 
technology, Technology itself 
Resistance to change and 
structural inertia, Poor change 
management 
Level 2 
Conditions 
Bodtker & Jameson (2001),  Barki and 
Hartwick (2001),  
Ljungström and Klefsjö (2002), Mumford 
(2003), Ciborra and Andreu (2001), Effron 
(2004) 
 
Markus (1983), Markus & Benjamin 1996, 
Sahay & Robey (1996), Kumar et al. (1998), 
Cairns & Beech (19999, Dewulf & van Meel 
(2002), Jiang et al. (2002), Mumford (2003). 
Newman and Noble (1990), Siponen 2002 
Benamati and Lederer (2000) 
Newman and Sabherwal (1996),   
Lorenzi and Riley (2003),  
Lucas 1981).    
Conflict with emotion 
Lack of knowledge, Poor 
knowledge sharing 
Inactiveness  
 
Poor user participation 
User participation as a 
manipulative tool 
Poor user contribution,  
User participation as a security 
threat 
 
Unsuitable technology  
Erratic commitment 
Poor decision making process 
Level 1 
Event  
chain 
Benamati and Lederer (2000)  
 
Outdated technology  
 
Table 1.  Summary of review of IS success literature categorized to hierarchical model. 
In case there is no understanding between different parties the interaction can severely be 
aggravated. It may lead to difficult problems in continuing the implementation but at least it 
will impede the interaction and discussion in the project.  
 
From the experience gained in this case, the authors believe that the impeding problem in 
collaboration may lie in the role of the different parties. E.g. the character of the FVU differs 
from the roles of the universities. The FVU is not a “real” university but a virtual one and its 
main task is to promote and develop networking among universities. MoSu is very much 
networking and it might be that the main reason for discomfort in collaboration roots into 
power game about owning the networking and mobility between universities. The case 
highlighted holding knowledge as an obstacle, preventing the building of collaboration 
between vendors and slowing down the requirement specifications that were dependent on 
the lacking knowledge. Holding knowledge can be related to working culture – if the working 
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culture does not support writing memos from meetings, a lot of knowledge remains 
undistributed.  
 
The role of interaction rises in this study. The case showed that with sufficient interaction 
overlapping in work could be decreased. It seemed that there were intentional lacks of 
knowledge sharing and removing them appeared difficult to manage. The interorganizational 
“learning ladders” introduced by Ciborra and Andreu (2001) were not taken into use. The 
authors believe that the responsibility of sufficient interaction belongs to the project manager 
and she should be able to perceive the lack and insufficiency of interaction. The lack on 
perceiving can hinder the implementation process but when handled in time it probably will 
not torpedo the implementation. 
 
Some of the recognized obstacles can be classified as organizational obstacles. One obstacle 
appeared bigger that any other – overlapping projects – and it can be managed only by 
organizational maneuver. Managing two overlapping projects so that overlapping will 
disappear, demands organizational skills and ability. In a sense choosing project manager is 
also an organizational issue but possible shortcomings may be cured by increasing social 
capabilities. 
 
Misunderstanding and lacks of interaction are phenomena of deficiencies in social 
capabilities among project participants. Wrong sort of information can affect as an obstacle. 
The officials were not interested in what technical way the application form is managed in the 
IS. The most important issue appears to be lack of noticing. Without noticing it is not 
possible to increase interaction or discussions between project parties. Noticing is needed 
also in order to change own attitudes or feelings in encounters. Without noticing 
misunderstanding it is not possible to increase understanding or build collaboration between 
project parties. 
 
 
Level 3. Systemic factors
Level 2. Conditions
Level 1. Example of event chain in Failure Mechanism
Several parties involved
Disputes over focus
Overlapping projects
Different working cultures
Power game between projects parties
Changes in specifications and plans
Incomplete specifications
Nature of information
Shorcomings in project management
Competition
between project
parties
Holding
knowledge
Lack of
co-operation
 
Figure 2.  Hierarchical Model to define obstacles in information system implementation. 
Adapted from Leveson (2001).   
 
Figure 2 presents the obstacles from the case categorized in three levels: systemic factors, 
conditions and events. This model gives understanding to the relations between obstacles 
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placing them into their contexts. It offers a direct, quite well identified process (people, 
technique, etc.) which had lead to negative situations. This process is depending on 
circumstances and conditions (e.g. poor management, resources, decision making process, 
and poor information) where it acts. Circumstances depend on society (or any other large 
system where it acts) with poor education, general technology failures, inadequate laws, 
instructions, human behavior etc. The authors have shown that a model designed for risk 
management can be used also when managing obstacles in information system 
implementation. Like analyzing risks it is useful to use models when analyzing obstacles. 
Managing problems and obstacles will benefit from the model introduced by Leveson (2001).  
 
7. Conclusion 
The hierarchical framework introduced by Leveson (2001) gives a new approach that is not 
used in information systems field. When using it in IS success research, categorization of 
obstacles and risk factors comes clearer. The tree-tiered hierarchical model is near to 
Bateson’s communicative system and its use as framework in the study by Star and Ruhleder 
(1996), although point of view differs. This model has also benefits in IS implementation risk 
management when selecting suitable methods and controls. Anyway, this demonstrates that 
the model needs some improvements. 
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